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T he Government of India hasinitiated a series of moves to
replace the current system of subsidies
embodied in the price of essential
commodities sold in the Public Distribution
System with one of cash transfers to the poor.
The Finance Minister announced the step in
this direction in his Budget Speech in
February 2011 and pilot projects are being
launched in selected districts. The case for
this fundamental transformation is built
around the widespread belief that corruption
has eroded the Public Distribution System
(PDS). It is argued that a major portion of
current subsidies is wasted as the subsidized
commodities don’t reach the poor. It would
then be more efficient if, instead of
subsidizing the commodity, money was
directly transferred to the bank accounts of
the poor. The simplicity of this argument
makes its conclusion appear obvious. But
this very simplicity hides a number of
assumptions. Once these assumptions are
made explicit it is clear that they are not
quite realistic. And when they are dropped,
it is no longer certain that the cash transfers
will be better than the present system. On
the contrary, once the assumptions are
dropped it becomes evident that such a
change in the way subsidies are distributed
brings with it major risks of inflation as well
as a worsening in the already serious
problem of malnutrition.
In order to remove the veil over the
assumptions in the cash transfer argument
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this note states the problem in formal terms.
Each step in this formulation is first stated
verbally and then repeated in the form of
elementary algebra. Those with an aversion
to algebra at any level can follow the
argument by simply ignoring the equations.
The note goes on to analyze the
macroeconomic consequences of dropping
the hidden assumptions. And finally, it
returns to the realm of the household to list
the impact of cash transfers on different types
of households. In the process it highlights
the possibility of the severely disadvantaged
households, who cannot afford the
transaction costs of getting a Below Poverty
Line ration card, being more vulnerable to
the risks of cash transfers, leaving them
worse off than the current situation with all
its leakages.
TOWARDS A FORMAL STATEMENT
In the system that exists before the
move to cash transfers a household that is
entitled to subsidies receives them in the
form of lower prices for the subsidized
commodities. Going along with the
common perception that there is large scale
corruption in the Public Distribution
System, that household will buy what it can
get from the public distribution system and
will be forced to go to the open market for
the rest of its needs of that commodity. The
average cost the household bears for a unit
of the commodity is then the weighted
average of the open market price and the
PDS price of that commodity, with the
weight being the proportion of the




p = market price per unit of the commodity.
ce = average cost per unit of the commodity
to the consuming household in a system
where the subsidies are embodied in the price
of the commodity.
s = subsidy per unit of the commodity.
le = the proportion of that household’s
consumption of the commodity that it has
to buy in the open market.
Then
ce = (1 –le)(p – s) + lep
ce = p – s – lep + les + lep
ce = p – s + les

We can now move from a system
where the subsidy is embodied in a
commodity to one where the household buys
its entire requirement of the commodity from
the open market and the subsidy is given as
a cash transfer to its bank account. The
popular statement of this argument is that
the leakages now disappear so that the
household gets the entire subsidy in the form
of cash and is hence better off to the extent
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of the earlier leakages. This argument has
three rather critical assumptions.
The first, and most obvious, assumption
is that leakages are impossible when cash is
directly transferred to the accounts of those
entitled to subsidies. It is, arguably, true
that the scope for leakage between the
government’s account and the bank account
of those entitled to the subsidy is limited as
the transaction occurs within the banking
system. But it is quite possible that in the
list of those entitled to the subsidy there are
many who are not. This would be a leakage
in the subsidy. And that is the more benign
case. The more malignant example is that
of household names being used to create
separate entitlements and corresponding
bank accounts without their knowledge. The
subsidy can then be diverted into these
alternative bank accounts. And this is not
some fanciful example. In the case of the
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme each
household with members seeking to do
unskilled labour is entitled to one job card.
In reality, in a state like Karnataka there
are a number of households who have a job
card but on whose names there are also other
job cards with other bank account numbers.
This makes it possible to list fictional works
carried out by fictional workers who are
paid into these alternative bank accounts.
The official estimate of job cards with a
different number but the same name of the
head of household in the state is over 25
lakhs.1 Any assumption of there being no
leakages in a system of cash transfers simply
because the money is put directly into a bank
account is clearly much too facile and
underestimates the creativity that has been
noticed in corruption in India. It would be
more realistic to acknowledge that a certain
proportion of the subsidy due to a household
may not reach the bank account of that
household.
The second assumption relates to the
proportion of the cash transfer that will be
spent on the commodity that was originally
subsidized. A shift from a subsidy embodied
in the price of a commodity to a cash
transfer is, strictly speaking, a shift from a
subsidy for a commodity consumed by the
poor to a subsidy to poor households as a
whole. The cash transfers then need not go
back into buying the commodity that was
originally subsidized. In the simple
formulation of the cash transfer being no
more than a corruption-free replacement of
subsidies on the price of a commodity it is
assumed that the cash transfers would be
entirely spent on the commodity that was
originally subsidized. It could, of course, be
argued that even if this does not happen it
is a positive development as it shifts the
decision on what is to be subsidized from
the government to the household. And if we
1 Pani, Narendar and Chidambaran G Iyer (2011) Evaluation of the Impact of Processes in the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Karnataka. Bangalore, National Institute of
Advanced Studies, p 37.
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see development as freedom, giving
households the freedom to use their subsidies
as they please is an advance. This difference
is particularly significant as there is now
growing evidence that the demand patterns
of the poor do not necessarily follow norms
economists or governments would like.2
While this argument can be appealing,
especially in the abstract, in reality there
are two further, and somewhat less
convincing, assumptions being made. First,
it is assumed that the freedom of the person
who receives the cash subsidy into his or
her bank account is completely consistent
with the freedom of individuals within that
household. This ignores all scope for
differences within the household. These
differences are known to be quite significant,
especially on issues related to gender. And
the shift from a subsidy embodied in the price
of a commodity to a cash subsidy can have
a distinct gender dimension. When a subsidy
on kerosene is replaced by a cash transfer
that is spent on, say, a shirt for the male
head of the household, the subsidy moves
away from the kitchen. Even if the woman
thinks that is not the right choice, gender
relations within the household may not allow
her sentiment to be taken into account.
Second, it is also assumed that the shift from
commodity specific subsidies to a cash
transfer, that can be spent on any commodity,
does not in any way weaken the case for the
subsidy itself. That is to say, a moral case
that can be made for a subsidy on basic food
for the poor is just as valid for a subsidy on
a packet of cigarettes consumed by the poor.
It is then not inconceivable that the shift to
cash transfers will lead to situations where
the effective subsidy for food goes down while
increasing the effective subsidy for other
items including those like cigarettes. It is
then important that we take into account
the proportion of the cash transfer, that
replaces a commodity specific subsidy, that
is not spent on that commodity.
The third, and arguably the most
significant, assumption relates to the
inflationary pressure generated by cash
transfers. It is assumed that the open market
price of the commodity will not be affected
by the shift from commodity specific
subsidies to cash transfers. Thus the cost of
the commodity to the poor household will
be the same, since the difference between
the earlier subsidized price and the market
price will be met through the cash transfer.
This assumption completely ignores what
economists call the multiplier effect. Put
simply, when a certain amount is spent to,
say, buy a commodity it becomes income to
the seller of that commodity. A part of this
income may be saved and the rest spent on
other goods and services. This becomes
income to the seller of those other goods
and services, and so on. The overall increase
2 See for instance, Duflo, Esther (2007) “Poor but Rational?”in Abhijit Vinayak Banerji, Roland Bénabou
and Diliip Mukherjee (eds), Understanding Poverty, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
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in income then is a multiple of the original
expenditure.
In the current system the subsidy is
embodied in the price of the subsidized
commodity. That is to say, it is the difference
between the market price and the subsidized
price at which it is given to the consumer.
One part of this subsidy will be spent on
distribution with the consequent multiplier
effects. The effects of the other part of the
subsidy however exist only in the transaction
where the government procures the
commodity at a higher price and sells it at
a lower price. Once the commodity is
consumed the effect of this part of the
subsidy ceases.
In the case of cash transfers, however,
the effects of no part of the subsidy end
with the consumption of the commodity. The
entire cash subsidy that is used to buy the
commodity is income for the seller of that
commodity. When she saves a part of that
income and spends the rest, what is spent
becomes income for those who receive it,
and so on. The overall impact on income
would then be the subsidy times the
multiplier. Thus while in the current system
the multiplier effect is confined to that part
of the subsidy that is spent on distribution,
in the case of cash transfers the entire
subsidy is subject to the multiplier effect.
It is possible that this entire increase in
demand can be absorbed by additional
supply so that there is no effect on prices.
It is even conceivable that there is a glut
of the commodity at the time when the
increase in demand is created so that the
overall impact on prices is 0 or even
negative. But, if all other factors including
supply remain constant, the increase in
demand can only generate an upward
pressure on price. This additional multiplier-





S = total subsidy for the commodity.
Sye = income generated from the total
subsidy in the current form.
Syt = income generated from the total
subsidy as a cash transfser.
Syd = additional income generated from the
shift to cash transfsers.
d = Increase in the market price of the
subsidized commodity due to Syd .
r = the proportion of the total subsidy that
goes to meet distribution costs.
m = multiplier.
b = proportion of the last unit of income
that goes for consumption (the marginal
propensity to consume).
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where
m = 1 + b +b2 + b3 + . . . +bn +. . . =   1
        1-b
,
that is, m ≥ 1
Then,
S = (1-r)S + rS
In the current system since only the
distribution costs are subjected to the
multiplier, the overall effect of the subsidy
on income would be
Sye = (1-r)S + rSm
When the subsidy is converted into a cash
transfer both the distribution and non-
distribution components are affected by the
multiplier,
Syt = (1-r)Sm + rSm
the additional income generated through a
shift to cash transfers is then
Syd = (1-r)Sm - (1-r)S
Since m ≥ 1, Syd ≥ 0. As long as the income
effect on the demand for the subsidized




Within this general inflationary
pressure, there will be an impact on the open
market price of the commodity that was
originally being subsidized. A portion of the
increased income would be consumed at
each stage of the multiplier. And a portion
of that consumption could be on the
commodity that had the subsidy. All other
conditions being the same, the increase in
demand will generate an upward pressure
on the price of the commodity. The extent of
the rise in the price of the commodity,
everything else being the same, would
depend on two factors. First, the additional
demand for the originally subsidized
commodity would be determined by
proportion of the additional multiplier
generated income that is spent on that
commodity. And, second the impact of that
expenditure on the market price of that
commodity would be determined by the
ability of the market to absorb this
additional demand. In a situation where the
entire additional demand can be absorbed,
there will be no increase in price. But if some
part of this additional demand cannot be met
at the existing price, it will lead to an increase
in price. There is then a need to take into
account the difference in the open market
price of the originally subsidized commodity
before the shift to cash transfers and after.

Formally, let
ct = cost to the household of the commodity
that was originally subsidized, after the
subsidy is replaced by a cash transfer.
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lt = proportion of the cash subsidy that does
not reach the household entitled to the
subsidy.
n = proportion of the cash subsidy per unit
of the commodity that is not spent on the
commodity.
The simple case as it is popularly portrayed
along with the implicit assumptions would
then be
ct = p – s
Taking into account the possibility that in
an economy marked by corruption the entire
cash subsidy may not reach the household,
we have,
ct = p – s + lts
Taking on board the proportion of the cash
subsidy that is not spent on the commodity,
we have
ct = p – s + lts + ns
Adding the impact on the market price of
that commodity that results from the
additional multiplier effect, we have,
ct = p – s + lts + ns + d
If the cash transfers are to be preferred to
the system of commodity embodied subsidies,
ct <ce
that is
p – s + lts + ns + d < p – s + les
or
lts + ns + d < les

In non-algebraic terms, for cash
transfers to be preferred by a household to
the current system of subsidies embodied in
the price of a commodity, the sum of the
leakages in the cash transfers, share of the
subsidy that is diverted to commodities
other than the one originally subsidized, and
the increase in the price due to the additional
multiplier effect of cash subsidies, must be
less than the leakages in the current system
of delivering subsidized commodities
through the Public Distribution System.
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF
THE SHIFT TO CASH SUBSIDIES
While the formal statement of the
situation before cash subsidies and after has
been made on the basis of the cost to the
individual household it is important to
explore the macro economic implications
of the shift to cash transfers. There are at
least three significant macroeconomic
implications that demand our attention: the
possibility of inflation, the implications for
agriculture in the specific case of food
subsidies, and the consequences of a shift in
expenditure away from the commodity that
was seen to be requiring a subsidy.
It is important not to underestimate the
inflationary pressures that can be generated
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by the conversion of subsidies embodied in
the prices of commodities into cash transfers.
The addition to money supply as a result of
the shift to cash transfers is a multiple of
the transfers. And the amount that would be
involved in cash transfers if all major subsidies
were converted into cash is very substantial.
The major subsidies were as high as Rs
1,53,962 crores  in the revised estimates for
2010-11.3 Even if the government were to
restrict the movement from embodied subsidies
to cash transfers only to food subsidies the
numbers remain large. The revised estimate
for food subsidies in 2010-11 was Rs 60,600
crores. No matter how conservative we are in
estimating the multiplier, cash transfers of this
magnitude would generate significant
inflationary pressures.
These inflationary pressures will reduce
the effect of the subsidy on the product, since
it is likely to raise the price of the commodity
that was being subsidized. The cash
equivalent of the earlier subsidy will now
account for a lower proportion of the higher
price of that commodity. And if the
government chooses to offset this effective
reduction in the subsidy by increasing the
amount of cash transferred to the households,
this will further increase the upward pressure
generated on income and prices.
It could be argued that the inflationary
impact can be controlled through monetary
policy. The Reserve Bank of India could be
asked to adjust money supply in a way that
offsets the additional demand generated by
the shift to cash subsidies from subsidies
embodied in the price of a commodity. But
this only increases the pressures on monetary
policy. The government’s dependence on
monetary policy to control prices has already
had its impact on its growth strategy. A
crucial component of the liberalization
exercise was to move towards a regime of
low interest rates. A regime where interest
rates fluctuate within a band that is lower
than what existed before liberalization was
essential to encourage private investment.
And in the first decade after liberalization
there was an effective movement in this
direction. But the government has not been
able to sustain this regime. Its focus on
monetary policy has led it to raise interest
rates in an effort to curb inflation. Indeed,
stubborn food inflation has seen the Reserve
Bank raising interest rates even as there are
signs of a slowdown in the economy. To ask
monetary policy to take on the additional
burden of managing inflationary pressures
generated by a shift to cash transfers would
place further constraints on growth. At a time
when food inflation has been stubborn even
after the economy has sacrificed some of its
growth, shifting over to cash subsidies could
be playing with inflationary fire.
The impact of a shift to cash transfers
on the procurement of rice and wheat will
also have a significant, and politically
sensitive, impact on agriculture. As is widely
3 The revised estimates of major subsidies and its food subsidy component are rounded off from the figures
in the Expenditure Budget 2011-12.
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known, food subsidies in India are not merely
a subsidy to the household consuming the
subsidized food grains. They are a part of
an elaborate mechanism which begins by
first procuring foodgrains at a remunerative
price from farmers and then selling it at a
subsidized price through the Public
Distribution System. This mechanism aims
not just to subsidize food to the consumer
but to simultaneously protect the interests
of farmers. The guaranteed procurement at
a predetermined remunerative price ensures
the farmer has no reason to sell in the
market at a lower price. The procurement
price then acts as a floor price for foodgrains.
Without that price we could have a crash in
prices in years of surplus production. With
the share of agriculture already declining
to around a sixth of GDP4 the possibility of
a dramatic fall in prices, after inflation has
raised expectations, would add to the risk
farmers have to take at a time when farmers’
suicides are demanding national attention.
It is no doubt true that the current
procurement and subsidy system may have
outlived its utility. The mechanism of
procuring at a remunerative price and
selling at a subsidized one can be controlled
as long as all that is procured can be sold.
The government in such a situation knows
the precise amount the subsidy will cost. But
when the entire procured stocks cannot be
sold the cost of procuring and holding unsold
stocks becomes an addition to the subsidy
without a corresponding benefit to the
consumer. There is clearly a case for the
current mechanism to be reformed. It is
possible to come up with an alternative
mechanism that meets the dual requirements
of protecting the farmers’ interests as well
as ensuring the availability of grain to
consumers without the burden of huge unsold
stocks. We cannot digress to that debate here.
But what is clear is that merely abandoning
the procurement system by moving to cash
transfers is not an alternative. It would place
a huge burden on an already ignored
agricultural sector. And by simply
dismantling a rural infrastructure that has
served the country well in the past would
amount to throwing the baby out with the
bath water.
The third major macroeconomic
dimension of the shift from food subsidies
embodied in the price of commodities to one
of cash transfers is in the realm of the
possibility of spending being diverted to
items that do not deserve a subsidy.
Whatever the merits of granting unbridled
freedom to spend subsidies to the individual
in the household who receives the cash
transfers, it is important to remember that
this is being advocated at a time when
the country faces a serious crisis of
undernutrition. It has been noted “that
anthropometric indicators of nutrition in
India, for both adults and children, are
among the worst in the world. Furthermore,
4 Agriculture accounts for 16.93 percent of GDP as per the Quick Estimates for GDP in 2009-10 provided
in Economic Survey 2010-11.
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the improvement of these measures of
nutrition appears to be slow relative to what
might be expected in the light of
international experience and of India’s recent
high rates of economic growth . . .
Undernutrition levels in India remain higher
than for most countries of sub-Saharan
Africa, even though these countries are
currently much poorer than India, have
grown much more slowly, and have much
higher levels of infant and child mortality.”5
Any movement of the poor away from food
towards other items will worsen this
situation. And the idea that government
subsidies may contribute to such a shift is
very difficult to justify.
The macroeconomic impact of the shift
from embodied subsidies to cash transfers,
especially in the specific situation the Indian
economy finds itself in, is therefore not
insignificant. It will generate inflationary
pressures that could reduce the effective
quantum of the subsidy. If the government
chooses not to let this happen, it would have
to increase the amount of the cash subsidy.
The additional cash transfers will only add
further to the inflationary pressures. Any
effort by the government to control these
pressures through monetary policy would
make it that much more difficult to achieve
the aim of liberalization to move steadily
towards a lower interest rate regime. In
addition, the dismantling of the procurement
system implicit in a shift to cash transfers
of the food subsidy will add to the crisis in
agriculture. And to make matters worse, the
diversion of the cash subsidy for food at the
household level to items other than food will
add to the already serious problem of
undernutrition.
THE IMPACT ON THE HOUSEHOLD
Against this macroeconomic backdrop
we can now get back to the initial question
of whether the shift from subsidies embodied
in the price of commodities to a system of
direct cash transfers provides a solution that
is better than the current one based on a
public distribution system that is widely
believed to be ridden with corruption. When
we get back to the level of the household it
is quite evident that the effect of several of
the factors we have discussed will vary from
household to household. The extent to which
subsidies will be diverted to the consumption
of items that were not intended to be
subsidized will not be the same across
households. The ability to get a household’s
entitlement of subsidized foodgrains from
the Public Distribution System in a system
that is widely believed to be ridden with
corruption will also vary depending on the
influence of individual households. In
tracking the effect of the shift from
embodied subsidies to cash transfers we
would be better off not focusing on some
5 Deaton, Angus and Jean Dreze (2009) ‘Food and Nutrition in India: Facts and Interpretations’ Economic
and Political Weekly, Vol XLIV No 7, February 14, 2009, p 42.
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average household, but recognizing at least
some different sets of households. In the
context of general perceptions of corruption
within which the debate on cash transfers is
based, it would be useful to consider three
broad types of households. First, we can
consider those poor households that have
been completely bypassed when Below
Poverty Line or Antyodaya cards were
given. These households have not got the
benefit the current system is supposed to
provide the poor and equally significantly,
they will also not be able to claim cash
subsidies. And the number of such households
need not be very low. A recent survey in
Karnataka first classified as chronic poor
those who did not have any of a set of seven
assets, including land, a cycle or a television.
In three of the five regions of the state around
a fifth of the chronic poor did not have either
a BPL card or an Antyodaya card.6
At the other extreme we can take
households where the current system is
working well and the poor have full access
to the subsidized commodities they are
entitled to. It is important to note that while
there is talk of large scale corruption there is
no claim that the system does not work
anywhere. Even if we accept without question
estimates that put the leakage in the Public
Distribution System at 40 percent, this
leakage need not be evenly distributed across
every shop in the Public Distribution System
and all the households each shop covers. It is
then quite possible that the remaining 60
percent covers a number of households that
receive their entire entitlements.
The third type of household will be the
one the case for cash transfers assumes to
be universal across the country. This
household does not get any of the subsidized
commodities it is entitled to in the current
system, but will get the entire benefit of the
cash transfer when it happens.
The first set of households has no access
to subsidies whether they are embodied in
the price of the commodity or as cash
transferred directly into their bank accounts.
As they get no subsidies their entire
entitlement becomes a leakage and there is
no question of there being any diversion of
the subsidy to other commodities by the
household. They have been buying entirely
in the open market and will continue to do
so. They will however be affected by any
increase in the market price of the
commodity caused by the additional
multiplier effect of cash transfers. These
households are therefore likely to be worse
off after the shift from embodied subsidies
to cash subsidies. And the extent to which
they will be worse off will be determined by
the extent of inflation that results from the
shift to cash transfers.

6 Pani, Narendar and Chidambaran G Iyer (2011) Evaluation of the Impact of Processes in the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in Karnataka. Bangalore, National Institute of
Advanced Studies, p 69.
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Formally,
The situation for this set of households after
the shift from embodied subsidies to cash
subsidies will be better if
p – s + lts + ns + d < p – s + les
Since s = 0
p + d < p
Since d ≥ 0, the household will be either
worse off or, at best, in the same situation.

The second set of households is those
where the current system is working well.
They are able to get the subsidized
commodities from the Public Distribution
System as per their entitlement. They stand
to shift to a new system which might well
develop leakages. At the level of the
individual commodity that can be subsidized
there can be a diversion of the cash subsidy
to other items and they also have to face
any increase in the price of the commodity
due to the shift to cash transfers. In the best
case scenario where the household gets the
entire benefit of cash transfers without any
increase in the price of commodity, it will
be left in the same situation where it was
when it got the entire benefit of the subsidy
embodied in the price of the commodity. But
if, as is likely, the additional multiplier effect
due to cash transfers raises the price of the
commodity the household would be worse
off. And the situation would be worse if there
are leakages in cash transfers or if the
subsidy is diverted to wasteful items.

Formally,
The situation for this set of households after
the shift from embodied subsidies to cash
transfers will be better if
p – s + lts + ns + d < p – s + les
Since the current system is working well,
les = 0
p – s + lts + ns + d < p – s
If lts + ns + d > 0, the household will be
worse off.

The third type of household is one
where the existing system is working badly
and the new one will work well. As this
household gets no benefit from the existing
system, it is paying the market price for the
commodity. In this case there will also be
no leakage in the cash transfers. The only
pressures here will be from the diversion of
the subsidy to other items and the increase
in the price of the commodity due to
inflation generated by the shift to cash
transfers. If what is left of the subsidy after
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a part is diverted to other items is not greater
than the increase in the price of the
commodity the household will be worse off




The situation for this set of households after
the shift from embodied subsidies to cash
transfers will be better if
p – s + lts + ns + d < p – s + les
Since the entire embodied subsidy is leaked,
les = s.
Also since the new system is working
perfectly, lts = 0
Or
p – s + ns + d < p
that is
ns + d < s
  
The proposed conversion of the cash
subsidy embodied in the price of a
commodity to cash transfers to the poor thus
raises a number of concerns both at the
macroeconomic level and at the level of the
household. At the macroeconomic level it
risks higher inflation and a worsening of the
problem of malnutrition. And at the
household level its effects are far from
promising. The poorest households that
cannot afford the transaction costs involved
in getting a BPL or Antyodaya card are
likely to be worse off as they would have to
bear the burden of any inflation generated
by the shift to cash transfers. The shift to
cash transfers would move households in
areas where the current system is working
well to a system of greater uncertainties.
Even among the households in areas where
the old system is at its worst and the new
one of cash transfers works perfectly, its
beneficial effect could be jeopardized by a
portion of the subsidy being diverted to other
commodities and the inflation generated
through the shift to cash transfers wiping
out atleast a part of the remaining subsidy.
The differential impact across different
types of households also has implications
for the targeting of the subsidy. The process
of getting the subsidy across to the poor
has two stages: the identification of the
poor, and ensuring the identified households
have access to their entitlements. The
argument for cash transfers is that it will
do better at ensuring that those who are
identified as the poor get the full benefit of
the subsidy. It is assumed that those among
the poor who are not identified as poor will
be in the same situation whether they are
under the current system of subsidies
embodied in the price of the commodity or
in the system of cash transfers. But once
we take on board the inflationary impact
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of the shift to cash transfers, those who
cannot afford the transaction costs of being
officially recognized as poor will be clearly
worse off. It is quite possible, even likely,
that those among the poor who cannot
afford the transaction costs of being
recognized as poor are likely to be the
poorest. Thus even if the shift to cash
transfers does better at targeting those who
are identified as the poor, the inflationary
pressure it generates will ensure it does so
at the cost of the poorest.


